Here is a great article entitled, “James D. Strauss' Critique of Jonathan Edwards' Freedom of the Will” by John Piper.
Here’s the link: http://www.desiringgod.org/ResourceLibrary/Articles/ByDate/1976/1481 It’s good in that there is some interaction on:
1. Motive as not the same as the mind’s judgment of it
2. Mechanistic view of Edwards’s philosophy
Here’s Edwards on why he does not believe his doctrine makes men no more than mere machines. Piper states that Strauss completely ignores this passage. If we come back to mechanism, it might be good to mark this section for conversation:
“As to the objection against the doctrine which I have endeavored to prove, that it makes men no more than mere machines; I would say, that not withstanding this doctrine, man is entirely, perfectly and unspeakably different from a mere machine, in that he has reason and understanding, and has a faculty of will, and so is capable of volition and choice; and in that his will is guided by the dictates or views of his understanding; and in that his external actions and behavior and in many respects also his thoughts, and the exercises of his mind, are subject to his will; so that he has liberty to act according to his choice, and do what he pleases; and by means of these things is capable of moral habits and moral acts... [FOTW, pp. 255-256].”
Monday, July 16, 2007
Wednesday, July 11, 2007
Who can see them?
Edwards argues from pages 111-148 that God's certain foreknowledge makes impossible the notion that the wills of moral agents are contingent events or not connected with anything foregoing.
There is a great summary of the above section on pp. 144-145 and again on p. 147. I quoted this section in our worship folder last Sunday as an expository help for our public reading of Luke 6 where in v. 8 we read that Christ "knew their thoughts." I found that Edwards's last quotation in Latin is from Boethius. This section is theologically glorious:
“There is no event, past, present, or to come, that God is ever uncertain of; he never is, never was, and never will be without infallible knowledge of it; he always sees the existence of it to be certain and infallible. And as he always sees things just as they are in truth, hence there never is a possibility that they may not exist . . . For if the known event should fail of existence, and not come into being, as God expected, then God would see it, and so would change his mind, and see his former mistake; and thus there would be a change and succession in his knowledge. But as God is immutable [unchangeable], and so it is utterly infinitely impossible that his view should be changed; so it is, for the same reason, just so impossible that the foreknown event should not exist; and that is to be impossible in the highest degree: and therefore the contrary is necessary. Nothing is more impossible than that the immutable God should be changed by the succession of time; who comprehends all things, from eternity to eternity, in one most perfect and unalterable view; so that his whole eternal duration is vita interminabilis, tota, simul, et perfecta possessio [a life, without beginning or end, or succession, and of the most perfect kind].”
There is a great summary of the above section on pp. 144-145 and again on p. 147. I quoted this section in our worship folder last Sunday as an expository help for our public reading of Luke 6 where in v. 8 we read that Christ "knew their thoughts." I found that Edwards's last quotation in Latin is from Boethius. This section is theologically glorious:
“There is no event, past, present, or to come, that God is ever uncertain of; he never is, never was, and never will be without infallible knowledge of it; he always sees the existence of it to be certain and infallible. And as he always sees things just as they are in truth, hence there never is a possibility that they may not exist . . . For if the known event should fail of existence, and not come into being, as God expected, then God would see it, and so would change his mind, and see his former mistake; and thus there would be a change and succession in his knowledge. But as God is immutable [unchangeable], and so it is utterly infinitely impossible that his view should be changed; so it is, for the same reason, just so impossible that the foreknown event should not exist; and that is to be impossible in the highest degree: and therefore the contrary is necessary. Nothing is more impossible than that the immutable God should be changed by the succession of time; who comprehends all things, from eternity to eternity, in one most perfect and unalterable view; so that his whole eternal duration is vita interminabilis, tota, simul, et perfecta possessio [a life, without beginning or end, or succession, and of the most perfect kind].”
Friday, June 29, 2007
Unspoken Assumptions
I have not heard whether or not we are actually meeting face-to-face today, so I will briefly review some questions/objections that I have encountered as I have read the first 94 pages of this tome.
Edwards seem to think of the will as a sort of physical entity within a person that experiences causes (motives) that move it to act. He frequently uses illustrations that smack of the physics of inertia and momentum. He exemplifies a series of causations as a chain of links, such that moving the first link effectively moves the last link. The idea that each man, when confronted by a constellation of events, ALWAYS chooses the action that does him the most good makes him the slave of those events. It makes him a self-centered biological organism.
It seems to me that a person acting in the flesh will do this most of the time, BUT maybe not all of the time. Though Edwards assumes that heroic acts of parents to sacrifice for their children to a be in their procreative good or of soldiers to sacrifice for their comrades to be in their communal good, I find these to be questionable assumptions to dismiss the idea that human beings can choose to place the good of others above their own good.
Man has been created in the image of God, and so he has the ability to be creative. He cannot create physical matter as God did, but he can create.
Man has a spirit that is greater than the spirit of animals, so though brute beasts MUST act according to the flesh man can rise above it. An animal must fight and kill to guard territory, but man can rise above this animal desire. An animal will procreate at any opportunity, but man can live in mongamy. An animal will tear at the flesh of a fallen animal as soon as it is safe, but man can wait at a table until all plates have been served. Rather than experiencing a chain of causes, wherein the first link is inexorably connected to the last, man may be able to choose a thought, an attitude, or an act at any point in the sequence. We were created to rule the universe, as stewards of God, not to be ruled by it.
If I understand Scripture correcting the will of man is not separate from the soul of man, but an expression of the man. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three in one and all three are expressions of God working in concert. The Son did NOT work individually from God. The Holy Spirit does NOT work individually from God. Neither does the will work individually from the soul of the human being. The will is an expression of the human being. Writing that the will causes its willing as an absurdity assumes that the will is analagous to a physical object like a hammer. Of course I agree that a hammer cannot instigate hammering. But the will of a man that sees a physical object like a hammer may, because of many motives, may choose to hammer with it.
This same line of argument extends to the soul of man. The soul, created to manage the universe, is not driven by it and may express creativity in response to it. I grant that most of the time our choices seem follow a pattern of creating the most agreeable consequences for our existence in this world. I can't yet grant that this is true for all situations, so that one can conclude that the motives present in our circumstances DRIVE those choices. Influences do NOT decide the matter! Influences ONLY influence our choice.
What does this mean to me as a teacher? I'll weigh in with my opinion. When I can help a student understand right choices, then I will instruct and counsel as possible. When a student does not believe my counsel pre-act, then the consequences of the action provide opportunities for post-act discussion.
The nature of my pre-act instruction and counsel will affect my ability to provide post-act instruction and counsel. Students may be more ready to hear my counsel, when they are suffering negative consequences.
Students may be too immature to face certain choices. Wise mentoring chooses when the time is right for students to make choices. When I feel that the student or community would suffer consequences (that students cannot yet understand) that are too disastrous to accept, then I may refuse the student the opportunity to choose.
I look forward to the time when we can meet face-to-face to share our thoughts on these ideas. Until that time, I will continue reading and writing in the margins.
Edwards seem to think of the will as a sort of physical entity within a person that experiences causes (motives) that move it to act. He frequently uses illustrations that smack of the physics of inertia and momentum. He exemplifies a series of causations as a chain of links, such that moving the first link effectively moves the last link. The idea that each man, when confronted by a constellation of events, ALWAYS chooses the action that does him the most good makes him the slave of those events. It makes him a self-centered biological organism.
It seems to me that a person acting in the flesh will do this most of the time, BUT maybe not all of the time. Though Edwards assumes that heroic acts of parents to sacrifice for their children to a be in their procreative good or of soldiers to sacrifice for their comrades to be in their communal good, I find these to be questionable assumptions to dismiss the idea that human beings can choose to place the good of others above their own good.
Man has been created in the image of God, and so he has the ability to be creative. He cannot create physical matter as God did, but he can create.
Man has a spirit that is greater than the spirit of animals, so though brute beasts MUST act according to the flesh man can rise above it. An animal must fight and kill to guard territory, but man can rise above this animal desire. An animal will procreate at any opportunity, but man can live in mongamy. An animal will tear at the flesh of a fallen animal as soon as it is safe, but man can wait at a table until all plates have been served. Rather than experiencing a chain of causes, wherein the first link is inexorably connected to the last, man may be able to choose a thought, an attitude, or an act at any point in the sequence. We were created to rule the universe, as stewards of God, not to be ruled by it.
If I understand Scripture correcting the will of man is not separate from the soul of man, but an expression of the man. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three in one and all three are expressions of God working in concert. The Son did NOT work individually from God. The Holy Spirit does NOT work individually from God. Neither does the will work individually from the soul of the human being. The will is an expression of the human being. Writing that the will causes its willing as an absurdity assumes that the will is analagous to a physical object like a hammer. Of course I agree that a hammer cannot instigate hammering. But the will of a man that sees a physical object like a hammer may, because of many motives, may choose to hammer with it.
This same line of argument extends to the soul of man. The soul, created to manage the universe, is not driven by it and may express creativity in response to it. I grant that most of the time our choices seem follow a pattern of creating the most agreeable consequences for our existence in this world. I can't yet grant that this is true for all situations, so that one can conclude that the motives present in our circumstances DRIVE those choices. Influences do NOT decide the matter! Influences ONLY influence our choice.
What does this mean to me as a teacher? I'll weigh in with my opinion. When I can help a student understand right choices, then I will instruct and counsel as possible. When a student does not believe my counsel pre-act, then the consequences of the action provide opportunities for post-act discussion.
The nature of my pre-act instruction and counsel will affect my ability to provide post-act instruction and counsel. Students may be more ready to hear my counsel, when they are suffering negative consequences.
Students may be too immature to face certain choices. Wise mentoring chooses when the time is right for students to make choices. When I feel that the student or community would suffer consequences (that students cannot yet understand) that are too disastrous to accept, then I may refuse the student the opportunity to choose.
I look forward to the time when we can meet face-to-face to share our thoughts on these ideas. Until that time, I will continue reading and writing in the margins.
Tuesday, June 26, 2007
Temples, Sacred Images, and the Invisible Power of Ideas
I hope that you brothers are well. I’m at Panera Bread in Greenville, South Carolina – one of the few places with wireless internet access. I’ll try to find a few more wireless spots in Alabama [maybe at the Chat-n-Chew in Phil Campbell].
I mentioned in the last post that both Eve and Achan illustrate Edwards’s view that “what makes the will choose is something approved by the understanding and consequently appearing to the soul as good” [p. 88]. Or put another way [examining a different facet of the same diamond]: “Every act of the will is some way connected with the understanding, and is as the greatest apparent good is . . . namely, that the soul always wills and chooses that which . . . appears most agreeable” [p.86]. Or put in a different way: “The will necessarily follows this light or view of the understanding not only in some of its acts, but in every act of choosing and refusing. So that the will does not determine itself in any one of its own acts; but all its acts, every act of choice or refusal, depends on, and is necessarily connected with, some antecedent cause . . .” [p. 90].
Cause: Eve sees [understands or perceives] that the fruit is good [the apparent greatest good].
Effect: Eve eats the fruit [an act of the will]
Edwards uses temples and sacred images to illustrate that “the will itself, how absolute and incontrollable soever it may be thought, never fails in its obedience to the dictates of the understanding” [p. 87]:
“Temples have their sacred images; and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind; but in truth the ideas and images in men’s minds are the invisible powers that constantly govern them; and to these they all pay universally a ready submission” [p. 87].
So the question is:
How does the knowledge of ourselves, that the soul always wills and chooses that which appears most agreeable to the mind, inform our pedagogy as Christian teachers?
I mentioned in the last post that both Eve and Achan illustrate Edwards’s view that “what makes the will choose is something approved by the understanding and consequently appearing to the soul as good” [p. 88]. Or put another way [examining a different facet of the same diamond]: “Every act of the will is some way connected with the understanding, and is as the greatest apparent good is . . . namely, that the soul always wills and chooses that which . . . appears most agreeable” [p.86]. Or put in a different way: “The will necessarily follows this light or view of the understanding not only in some of its acts, but in every act of choosing and refusing. So that the will does not determine itself in any one of its own acts; but all its acts, every act of choice or refusal, depends on, and is necessarily connected with, some antecedent cause . . .” [p. 90].
Cause: Eve sees [understands or perceives] that the fruit is good [the apparent greatest good].
Effect: Eve eats the fruit [an act of the will]
Edwards uses temples and sacred images to illustrate that “the will itself, how absolute and incontrollable soever it may be thought, never fails in its obedience to the dictates of the understanding” [p. 87]:
“Temples have their sacred images; and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind; but in truth the ideas and images in men’s minds are the invisible powers that constantly govern them; and to these they all pay universally a ready submission” [p. 87].
So the question is:
How does the knowledge of ourselves, that the soul always wills and chooses that which appears most agreeable to the mind, inform our pedagogy as Christian teachers?
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
Preponderating Inducement, Eve, and Achan
The will cannot indifferently choose something over something else at the same time it is indifferent [p. 64]. Rather there must be as Edwards would put it a preponderating inducement or a prevailing influence on the will.
In other words, what one considers the greater good causes one to act:
"So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, annd that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate, and she also gave some to her husband who was with her, and he ate." Genesis 3.6 ESV
"When I saw among the spoil a beautiful cloak from Shinar, and 200 shekels of silver, and a bar of gold weighing 50 shekels, then I coveted them and took them." Joshua 7.21 ESV
In other words, what one considers the greater good causes one to act:
"So when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, annd that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate, and she also gave some to her husband who was with her, and he ate." Genesis 3.6 ESV
"When I saw among the spoil a beautiful cloak from Shinar, and 200 shekels of silver, and a bar of gold weighing 50 shekels, then I coveted them and took them." Joshua 7.21 ESV
Monday, June 18, 2007
Reepicheep's Notes on Part I, Section III
Part I, Section III: Concerning the Meaning of the Terms—Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, and Contingence
In this section, Edwards again makes a distinction between words used in common speech (he uses the term ‘vulgar’ for these) and the same words used in philosophical debates about the Will (he cites ‘metaphysicians, divines, philosophers and theologians’). Instead of bemoaning scholarship, he directs his efforts here to make philosophical usages clear since his essay must address them.
I understand his use of “necessity” best when it is held up as an opposite to “impossible.” The word “impossible” implies an understanding of “possible.” In that sense, “possibility” is the referent for “impossibility.” But “necessity” is where something must occur—it is more than possible; it “must” exist or come to pass.
This is not how we use the word in ordinary conversation—as Edwards warns us. I might say, “It is necessary for you to walk through the bedroom in order to access the washroom in our apartment.” You might reply, “OK, unless I climbed through the washroom window instead.” The sense in which I had used “necessity” assumed polite behavior. This usage is an example of the word in ordinary, “vulgar” use.
“Philosophical Necessity,” on the other hand might sound like this: “Necessity demands that you first leave the living room in order to make an arrival in the washroom.” Or, “Given the state of nature, it is necessary to exist in only one room at a time.” There is a “must” between the subject and the condition of action. A quarrel with this sort of “Philosophical Necessity” would force an allowance of radically absurd “impossibilities” (e.g. it would have to be allowed that one can both be and not be the same thing, etc). The law of noncontradiction, basic to all western thought, undergirds this understanding of Philosophical Necessity.
If I have properly interpreted his meaning, the following quotations from this section unfold neatly:
“When the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms the existence of any thing, either substance, quality, act, or circumstance, have a full and certain connexion, then the existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary, in a metaphysical sense. And in this sense I use the word necessity in the following discourse, when I endeavour to prove that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty.” (p. 19, ¶3) For instance, if we consider the statement “God is holy,” it is first necessary in the philosophical sense which Edwards will use the word to agree that the understanding, “God exists” is the metaphysical basis for, “God is holy.” Being itself precedes a property of that being’s nature.
“. . . the only way that any thing that is to come to pass hereafter, is or can be necessary, is by a connexion with something that is necessary in its own nature, or with something that already is, or has been; so that the one being supposed, the other certainly follows. And this, also, is the only way that all things past, excepting those which were from eternity, could be necessary before they came to pass, or could come to pass necessarily; and therefore the only way in which any effect or event, or any thing whatsoever that ever has had or will have a beginning, has come into being necessarily, or will hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the necessity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts of the will.” (p. 21, ¶2) A marriage vow promises faithfulness, “in sickness and in health,” but this promise of future faithfulness is predicated on the character of the person making the promise. The future fulfillment of that vow depends on (1) the fixed definition of faithfulness and (2) the quality of the person who has sworn their loyal love. In this sense we might say, “If you are faithful, you will keep your marriage vows.” Philosophical Necessity then hangs upon the nature of “faithfulness.” It is precisely because no man or woman is necessarily faithful by nature that wedding vows are made before God and fellow men. A husband and wife must seek God to teach them steadfast love—precisely because it is not found in human nature but in Him alone! Of God we can say, “He causes the rain to fall on the just and the unjust.” This is a pan-historical statement: it has been so from the beginning and it will be until the end. The statement necessarily depends on the nature of God Himself. Because God is all-aware and all-powerful in His nature (i.e. these qualities are what render Him to be “God” over and against a “god”), it necessarily follows that He, “causes the rain to fall on the just and the unjust.”
~Reepicheep~
In this section, Edwards again makes a distinction between words used in common speech (he uses the term ‘vulgar’ for these) and the same words used in philosophical debates about the Will (he cites ‘metaphysicians, divines, philosophers and theologians’). Instead of bemoaning scholarship, he directs his efforts here to make philosophical usages clear since his essay must address them.
I understand his use of “necessity” best when it is held up as an opposite to “impossible.” The word “impossible” implies an understanding of “possible.” In that sense, “possibility” is the referent for “impossibility.” But “necessity” is where something must occur—it is more than possible; it “must” exist or come to pass.
This is not how we use the word in ordinary conversation—as Edwards warns us. I might say, “It is necessary for you to walk through the bedroom in order to access the washroom in our apartment.” You might reply, “OK, unless I climbed through the washroom window instead.” The sense in which I had used “necessity” assumed polite behavior. This usage is an example of the word in ordinary, “vulgar” use.
“Philosophical Necessity,” on the other hand might sound like this: “Necessity demands that you first leave the living room in order to make an arrival in the washroom.” Or, “Given the state of nature, it is necessary to exist in only one room at a time.” There is a “must” between the subject and the condition of action. A quarrel with this sort of “Philosophical Necessity” would force an allowance of radically absurd “impossibilities” (e.g. it would have to be allowed that one can both be and not be the same thing, etc). The law of noncontradiction, basic to all western thought, undergirds this understanding of Philosophical Necessity.
If I have properly interpreted his meaning, the following quotations from this section unfold neatly:
“When the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms the existence of any thing, either substance, quality, act, or circumstance, have a full and certain connexion, then the existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary, in a metaphysical sense. And in this sense I use the word necessity in the following discourse, when I endeavour to prove that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty.” (p. 19, ¶3) For instance, if we consider the statement “God is holy,” it is first necessary in the philosophical sense which Edwards will use the word to agree that the understanding, “God exists” is the metaphysical basis for, “God is holy.” Being itself precedes a property of that being’s nature.
“. . . the only way that any thing that is to come to pass hereafter, is or can be necessary, is by a connexion with something that is necessary in its own nature, or with something that already is, or has been; so that the one being supposed, the other certainly follows. And this, also, is the only way that all things past, excepting those which were from eternity, could be necessary before they came to pass, or could come to pass necessarily; and therefore the only way in which any effect or event, or any thing whatsoever that ever has had or will have a beginning, has come into being necessarily, or will hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the necessity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts of the will.” (p. 21, ¶2) A marriage vow promises faithfulness, “in sickness and in health,” but this promise of future faithfulness is predicated on the character of the person making the promise. The future fulfillment of that vow depends on (1) the fixed definition of faithfulness and (2) the quality of the person who has sworn their loyal love. In this sense we might say, “If you are faithful, you will keep your marriage vows.” Philosophical Necessity then hangs upon the nature of “faithfulness.” It is precisely because no man or woman is necessarily faithful by nature that wedding vows are made before God and fellow men. A husband and wife must seek God to teach them steadfast love—precisely because it is not found in human nature but in Him alone! Of God we can say, “He causes the rain to fall on the just and the unjust.” This is a pan-historical statement: it has been so from the beginning and it will be until the end. The statement necessarily depends on the nature of God Himself. Because God is all-aware and all-powerful in His nature (i.e. these qualities are what render Him to be “God” over and against a “god”), it necessarily follows that He, “causes the rain to fall on the just and the unjust.”
~Reepicheep~
Tuesday, June 12, 2007
Reepicheep's Notes on Part I, Section II
Part I, Section II: Concerning the Determination of the Will
In this section Edwards has spun a thick web of thoughts for his reader. Most meagerly educated persons—such as me—are likely to become lost by the abstraction of his discourse. I am left wanting at least three kinds of aid: first, identification and definition of particular terms he requires the reader to understand; second, a paragraph-by-paragraph outline of his argument to highlight his complex exposition; and finally an example that models the application of his rigorous distinctions and guiding principles.
Terms Important to this Section
Determine: to direct and commit towards something; to choose a particular
Determiner: used synonymously with “motive” (see MOTIVE below)
Will: that faculty of the human soul which chooses; this is not used by Edwards as a wildly autonomous faculty of the mind, rather, it is hinged to the choice itself—much like the sun and sunlight are inextricable
Object: the action committed to by a determined will; an objective; a candy bar is not a viable object as Edwards uses the term, rather, to eat the candy bar is an object of the determined will
Motive: the sum of what is within the sight of the choosing faculty which leads the mind to an act of choice; a motivation
Understanding: the perceiving faculty of the mind; distinct from the Will or the Appetites (including habit and instinct)
Excite: to energize with potential; a pre-action (imagined?) state of delight within the Will
Nature: the sum of all intrinsic qualities possessed by something
Circumstance: an extrinsic condition possessed by something
Good: in this context, whatever motive the mind acts upon is deemed “good” by the mind; the mind does not choose something that it does not believe is, at that moment, fully “good”; this is opposed to the GOOD sought after in the writings of Plato, etc.
Degree: a limiting aspect of any person’s ability to perceive
Manner: the limitations of perspective arising out of the incomplete relationship any viewer has with the thing viewed
Mind: this seems to be Edward’s most inclusive term, containing at least the understanding and the will; it is that within a person which reasons
State: a potentially nonpermanent quality of a thing; ice is a state of water—not its nature
Probable: a perceived likeliness; intuitive in his usage—not argued for or proven
Appetites: habits of taste developed over time—generally used in a pejorative manner; blind animal passions; the opposite of reason
Reason: a disposition of mind which seeks to understand the nature of a thing and its relationship to other things; that which classifies (e.g. language) and inquires about reality and the justification of knowledge claims; as opposed to the appetites
Lively: the state of something being excited, as he uses the term “excite”
Paragraph-by-Paragraph Brief
¶1……To “determine the will” is to choose a particular act as an object (or objective) over another (or others).
¶2……For a thing to be determined there must be “a determiner.” Either the will itself determines its own choice, or it is determined by something outside of itself.
¶3……The “determiner of the will” is a motive that the mind perceives to be strongest.
¶4……A motive is the whole of that which leads the mind to an act of volition. The “strongest motive” references the chief and final summation of the various parts of any motive which is acted upon.
¶5……A motive, in this sense, must be within the perception of the understanding.
¶6……Before a will commits to an act of choice, there are both stronger and weaker motives (or motivations) which excite the will; however, the will is always determined by the strongest motive.
¶7……Things viewed by the mind have their own nature and circumstances. The viewing mind has its own nature and circumstances. The view itself is limited by its own degree and manner. Appearances define reality for the mind. The strongest motive—upon which the mind invariably acts—is always deemed by that mind to be “good.”
¶8……“Good,” as used here, here simply means “pleasing” or “agreeable to.”
¶9……To choose what is more agreeable is to reject what is less agreeable. In the same sense, to choose what is “good” means to reject what is “evil.” Every consonance of the soul necessitates a rejection of some dissonance (what Locke calls “uneasiness”).
¶10…..The willing act involves direct or immediate perceptions of what action is good—not so much on remote objects. A man with liquor before him either wills to drink or to let the drink alone.
¶11…..A less direct object—instant pleasure over and against delayed hankering—is not directly presented to the will as an object of choice, and as such these are not what Edwards calls, “direct objects of volition.” The will cannot guarantee immediate pleasure or future misery; it can only choose to pick up or leave the drink.
¶12…..Based upon the distinctions above (¶10–11), Edwards says that, “the will always is as the greatest apparent good” rather than saying that, “the will is determined by the greatest apparent good.” Voluntary action is not determined by some separate abstraction called “choice”; rather simply that which appears in or about the mind’s view most agreeable.
¶13…..The apparent nature and circumstances of an object make it agreeable or disagreeable to the mind.
¶14…..Beauty or deformity can appear within the nature of an object rendering the mind disposed or indisposed to it.
¶15…..Attendant pleasure or trouble relative to the object may be considered part of the circumstances tightly bound to the object.
¶16…..All things being equal between two objects, a temporally nearer object will be viewed as possessing a more pleasing state than the further one.
¶17…..The manner of view—the dynamic relationship between an object and the mind—make that object agreeable or disagreeable to the mind.
¶18…..An object which appears to possess properties of pleasure more probable than another will appear more agreeable to the mind.
¶19…..We are most attached to (or influenced by) those things of which we have had sense experience. Positive experience gives an idea of something “liveliness.” Ideas apart from prior experience can at times possess a “lively quality.” All of the aforementioned contingencies (included in ¶13–18) affect the degree of “liveliness” attending such ideas.
¶20…..The temperament of the person affects his perception of an object because his views will be attached either to his appetites or to reason.
¶21…..The mind may cause the appearances of an object to vary between “beautiful” and “deformed”—making the object’s effect upon the mind more or less “lively.”
¶22…..Choice is always directed towards the greatest apparent good in a given moment.
¶23…..In some sense then, “the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding”—provided that the term “understanding” is taken to include both perception and reason (or judgment). But where Reason is speciously separated from Intuition or Habituation, then “understanding” is a divided thing and cannot be said to always rule the will.
¶24…..The ideas contained in this entire section are to be clarified in Edwards’ discourse on human liberty. His summation is: “the will is always determined by the strongest motive or by that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite volition.”
For Instance
I determined to read this section of our text and to journal my thoughts about it tonight instead of going to bed early or reading another book (¶1). Did my will act on its own or was there an external motivation? (¶2) There was a motive—what we commonly call “a reason”—behind this act (¶3). How can it be said that there was any single, driving motive that led me to choose? Afterall, my reasons were many: I thought that a day spent running errands should be balanced by an evening of rigorous contemplation; I was eager to catch up to where my colleagues were at in their readings; I was dissatisfied with my initial confusion after having first read the section several days ago; I was eager to post another outrageously long blog . . . and I suppose if I was patient enough, I could go on for a long time peeling apart the layers of my motivation. This is the point! All of these (and those unexamined) added together to weigh most heavily towards my determination to act. Altogether, Edwards would say, these lead to the formation of a strongest motive (¶4). I cannot imagine weightlessness as an alternative to my choice to read and write this evening because that is a state completely foreign to my understanding (¶5). While there were many exciting motives for the choice I made, the strongest motive ultimately engaged my will (¶6). I must have deemed it “good.” Why? The object of choice—reading and writing itself—had a particular nature and circumstantial quality. I, the person whose mind chose to read and write, have a particular nature and set of circumstances. The relation between my viewing and the object’s properties channels particular aspects of its nature more forcefully than others; in other words, there are other possible relations (e.g. if I were to revisit the possibility of reading and writing tomorrow morning, etc.) (¶7). By saying that reading and writing are “good,” I mean simply that the prospect pleased me more than some other alternative (¶8). The alternatives were esteemed “bad” by my choosing against them. I would have been “uneasy” without having chosen to read and write (¶9). My determination essentially came down to the motion of picking up the book and laptop rather than leaving them on my reading stand (¶10). I did not directly choose the virtue of discipline as more delightful than the vice of procrastination. Those are more remote objects of the will (¶11). At the commencement of my reading and writing, I must simply say that it pleased me—it was “good”—and I always do what appears “good” in that sense (¶12). This is not to say that reading and writing were necessarily good in and of themselves, rather that they appeared good to me at the point of volition (¶13). There was a kind of seemliness—a beauty of action—that presented itself to my mind as I considered what I would do. Likewise, there was a kind of inappropriateness—a deformity of action—in other options (¶14). Although the rigor involved in careful reading is not necessarily part of its nature (for a more intelligent person there might not be any rigor), it does attend my view of the choice so closely that it can be said to be part of the choice (¶15). What pleasure may be found in reading Freedom of the Will is much more accessible than that to be had in reading Calvin’s Institutes of Christian Religion because I do not have a copy of the Institutes in hand. The nearer of two pleasing objects is always deemed the most pleasing (¶16). Given my present circumstances—that the Edwards text is subject of much focus by my colleagues and given that my Dean procured the text for my study as an act of generosity, my perspective on the text affects a much greater degree of delight to my mind than if I were reading it alone and had purchased it against the better sense of my prudent, frugal wife (¶17). It is also more probable, in my estimation, that I will find deeper satisfaction in engaging with this book than in reading Kurt Vonnegut’s Welcome to the Monkey House (¶18). The idea of reading the Edwards is influenced by my recent, positive experience. Because of this positive experience, the idea of engaging again in further reading has a “lively quality” within my mind (¶19). My temperament, sometimes melancholy other times sanguine, is often given to the semi-obsessive pursuit of following Edwards’ line of thought (¶20). When I am inclined towards melancholy, the prospect of reading and writing takes on a more “beautiful” quality than when I am feeling sanguine (¶21). All of this adds up to making a choice: and I have chosen—as I will always do, according to Edwards—the greatest apparent good at the moment of choice (¶22). Does my Will then follow the last dictate of my Understanding? It seems that the answer depends on how we define “Understanding.” There are unexamined factors—other than reason alone—that greatly affect the mind. The whole of perception and reason combined may be said to, “rule the Will.” (¶23) Finally, my choice to read and write was governed by my motivation towards it based on previous, positive experiences which enlivened my view beyond the choice to not read and write (¶24).
If I have followed him correctly, Edwards has devised an architectural theory of the human soul (what he broadly sometimes refers to as the “mind”) in three interrelating parts: the understanding, the will and the appetites. These appear to be based on Platonic distinctions. The understanding perceives and reasons. The will chooses and therein engages the body. The appetites somehow engage unexamined mental processes that include intuition, the “subconscious,” habit, and instinct. His summation of this section is, “. . . the will is always determined by the strongest motive, or by that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite volition.” (p.15, ¶2)
In the end, Edwards admits that this has been a rather confusing section and he anticipates for the reader a clarification further ahead. In his own words, “. . . whether I have been so happy as rightly to explain the thing wherein consists the strength of motives, or not, my failing in this will not overthrow the position itself, which carries much of its own evidence with it, and is the thing of chief importance to the purpose of the ensuing discourse; and the truth of it I hope will appear with great clearness before I have finished what I have to say on the subject of human liberty.” (p.15, ¶2)
~Reepicheep~
In this section Edwards has spun a thick web of thoughts for his reader. Most meagerly educated persons—such as me—are likely to become lost by the abstraction of his discourse. I am left wanting at least three kinds of aid: first, identification and definition of particular terms he requires the reader to understand; second, a paragraph-by-paragraph outline of his argument to highlight his complex exposition; and finally an example that models the application of his rigorous distinctions and guiding principles.
Terms Important to this Section
Determine: to direct and commit towards something; to choose a particular
Determiner: used synonymously with “motive” (see MOTIVE below)
Will: that faculty of the human soul which chooses; this is not used by Edwards as a wildly autonomous faculty of the mind, rather, it is hinged to the choice itself—much like the sun and sunlight are inextricable
Object: the action committed to by a determined will; an objective; a candy bar is not a viable object as Edwards uses the term, rather, to eat the candy bar is an object of the determined will
Motive: the sum of what is within the sight of the choosing faculty which leads the mind to an act of choice; a motivation
Understanding: the perceiving faculty of the mind; distinct from the Will or the Appetites (including habit and instinct)
Excite: to energize with potential; a pre-action (imagined?) state of delight within the Will
Nature: the sum of all intrinsic qualities possessed by something
Circumstance: an extrinsic condition possessed by something
Good: in this context, whatever motive the mind acts upon is deemed “good” by the mind; the mind does not choose something that it does not believe is, at that moment, fully “good”; this is opposed to the GOOD sought after in the writings of Plato, etc.
Degree: a limiting aspect of any person’s ability to perceive
Manner: the limitations of perspective arising out of the incomplete relationship any viewer has with the thing viewed
Mind: this seems to be Edward’s most inclusive term, containing at least the understanding and the will; it is that within a person which reasons
State: a potentially nonpermanent quality of a thing; ice is a state of water—not its nature
Probable: a perceived likeliness; intuitive in his usage—not argued for or proven
Appetites: habits of taste developed over time—generally used in a pejorative manner; blind animal passions; the opposite of reason
Reason: a disposition of mind which seeks to understand the nature of a thing and its relationship to other things; that which classifies (e.g. language) and inquires about reality and the justification of knowledge claims; as opposed to the appetites
Lively: the state of something being excited, as he uses the term “excite”
Paragraph-by-Paragraph Brief
¶1……To “determine the will” is to choose a particular act as an object (or objective) over another (or others).
¶2……For a thing to be determined there must be “a determiner.” Either the will itself determines its own choice, or it is determined by something outside of itself.
¶3……The “determiner of the will” is a motive that the mind perceives to be strongest.
¶4……A motive is the whole of that which leads the mind to an act of volition. The “strongest motive” references the chief and final summation of the various parts of any motive which is acted upon.
¶5……A motive, in this sense, must be within the perception of the understanding.
¶6……Before a will commits to an act of choice, there are both stronger and weaker motives (or motivations) which excite the will; however, the will is always determined by the strongest motive.
¶7……Things viewed by the mind have their own nature and circumstances. The viewing mind has its own nature and circumstances. The view itself is limited by its own degree and manner. Appearances define reality for the mind. The strongest motive—upon which the mind invariably acts—is always deemed by that mind to be “good.”
¶8……“Good,” as used here, here simply means “pleasing” or “agreeable to.”
¶9……To choose what is more agreeable is to reject what is less agreeable. In the same sense, to choose what is “good” means to reject what is “evil.” Every consonance of the soul necessitates a rejection of some dissonance (what Locke calls “uneasiness”).
¶10…..The willing act involves direct or immediate perceptions of what action is good—not so much on remote objects. A man with liquor before him either wills to drink or to let the drink alone.
¶11…..A less direct object—instant pleasure over and against delayed hankering—is not directly presented to the will as an object of choice, and as such these are not what Edwards calls, “direct objects of volition.” The will cannot guarantee immediate pleasure or future misery; it can only choose to pick up or leave the drink.
¶12…..Based upon the distinctions above (¶10–11), Edwards says that, “the will always is as the greatest apparent good” rather than saying that, “the will is determined by the greatest apparent good.” Voluntary action is not determined by some separate abstraction called “choice”; rather simply that which appears in or about the mind’s view most agreeable.
¶13…..The apparent nature and circumstances of an object make it agreeable or disagreeable to the mind.
¶14…..Beauty or deformity can appear within the nature of an object rendering the mind disposed or indisposed to it.
¶15…..Attendant pleasure or trouble relative to the object may be considered part of the circumstances tightly bound to the object.
¶16…..All things being equal between two objects, a temporally nearer object will be viewed as possessing a more pleasing state than the further one.
¶17…..The manner of view—the dynamic relationship between an object and the mind—make that object agreeable or disagreeable to the mind.
¶18…..An object which appears to possess properties of pleasure more probable than another will appear more agreeable to the mind.
¶19…..We are most attached to (or influenced by) those things of which we have had sense experience. Positive experience gives an idea of something “liveliness.” Ideas apart from prior experience can at times possess a “lively quality.” All of the aforementioned contingencies (included in ¶13–18) affect the degree of “liveliness” attending such ideas.
¶20…..The temperament of the person affects his perception of an object because his views will be attached either to his appetites or to reason.
¶21…..The mind may cause the appearances of an object to vary between “beautiful” and “deformed”—making the object’s effect upon the mind more or less “lively.”
¶22…..Choice is always directed towards the greatest apparent good in a given moment.
¶23…..In some sense then, “the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding”—provided that the term “understanding” is taken to include both perception and reason (or judgment). But where Reason is speciously separated from Intuition or Habituation, then “understanding” is a divided thing and cannot be said to always rule the will.
¶24…..The ideas contained in this entire section are to be clarified in Edwards’ discourse on human liberty. His summation is: “the will is always determined by the strongest motive or by that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite volition.”
For Instance
I determined to read this section of our text and to journal my thoughts about it tonight instead of going to bed early or reading another book (¶1). Did my will act on its own or was there an external motivation? (¶2) There was a motive—what we commonly call “a reason”—behind this act (¶3). How can it be said that there was any single, driving motive that led me to choose? Afterall, my reasons were many: I thought that a day spent running errands should be balanced by an evening of rigorous contemplation; I was eager to catch up to where my colleagues were at in their readings; I was dissatisfied with my initial confusion after having first read the section several days ago; I was eager to post another outrageously long blog . . . and I suppose if I was patient enough, I could go on for a long time peeling apart the layers of my motivation. This is the point! All of these (and those unexamined) added together to weigh most heavily towards my determination to act. Altogether, Edwards would say, these lead to the formation of a strongest motive (¶4). I cannot imagine weightlessness as an alternative to my choice to read and write this evening because that is a state completely foreign to my understanding (¶5). While there were many exciting motives for the choice I made, the strongest motive ultimately engaged my will (¶6). I must have deemed it “good.” Why? The object of choice—reading and writing itself—had a particular nature and circumstantial quality. I, the person whose mind chose to read and write, have a particular nature and set of circumstances. The relation between my viewing and the object’s properties channels particular aspects of its nature more forcefully than others; in other words, there are other possible relations (e.g. if I were to revisit the possibility of reading and writing tomorrow morning, etc.) (¶7). By saying that reading and writing are “good,” I mean simply that the prospect pleased me more than some other alternative (¶8). The alternatives were esteemed “bad” by my choosing against them. I would have been “uneasy” without having chosen to read and write (¶9). My determination essentially came down to the motion of picking up the book and laptop rather than leaving them on my reading stand (¶10). I did not directly choose the virtue of discipline as more delightful than the vice of procrastination. Those are more remote objects of the will (¶11). At the commencement of my reading and writing, I must simply say that it pleased me—it was “good”—and I always do what appears “good” in that sense (¶12). This is not to say that reading and writing were necessarily good in and of themselves, rather that they appeared good to me at the point of volition (¶13). There was a kind of seemliness—a beauty of action—that presented itself to my mind as I considered what I would do. Likewise, there was a kind of inappropriateness—a deformity of action—in other options (¶14). Although the rigor involved in careful reading is not necessarily part of its nature (for a more intelligent person there might not be any rigor), it does attend my view of the choice so closely that it can be said to be part of the choice (¶15). What pleasure may be found in reading Freedom of the Will is much more accessible than that to be had in reading Calvin’s Institutes of Christian Religion because I do not have a copy of the Institutes in hand. The nearer of two pleasing objects is always deemed the most pleasing (¶16). Given my present circumstances—that the Edwards text is subject of much focus by my colleagues and given that my Dean procured the text for my study as an act of generosity, my perspective on the text affects a much greater degree of delight to my mind than if I were reading it alone and had purchased it against the better sense of my prudent, frugal wife (¶17). It is also more probable, in my estimation, that I will find deeper satisfaction in engaging with this book than in reading Kurt Vonnegut’s Welcome to the Monkey House (¶18). The idea of reading the Edwards is influenced by my recent, positive experience. Because of this positive experience, the idea of engaging again in further reading has a “lively quality” within my mind (¶19). My temperament, sometimes melancholy other times sanguine, is often given to the semi-obsessive pursuit of following Edwards’ line of thought (¶20). When I am inclined towards melancholy, the prospect of reading and writing takes on a more “beautiful” quality than when I am feeling sanguine (¶21). All of this adds up to making a choice: and I have chosen—as I will always do, according to Edwards—the greatest apparent good at the moment of choice (¶22). Does my Will then follow the last dictate of my Understanding? It seems that the answer depends on how we define “Understanding.” There are unexamined factors—other than reason alone—that greatly affect the mind. The whole of perception and reason combined may be said to, “rule the Will.” (¶23) Finally, my choice to read and write was governed by my motivation towards it based on previous, positive experiences which enlivened my view beyond the choice to not read and write (¶24).
If I have followed him correctly, Edwards has devised an architectural theory of the human soul (what he broadly sometimes refers to as the “mind”) in three interrelating parts: the understanding, the will and the appetites. These appear to be based on Platonic distinctions. The understanding perceives and reasons. The will chooses and therein engages the body. The appetites somehow engage unexamined mental processes that include intuition, the “subconscious,” habit, and instinct. His summation of this section is, “. . . the will is always determined by the strongest motive, or by that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite volition.” (p.15, ¶2)
In the end, Edwards admits that this has been a rather confusing section and he anticipates for the reader a clarification further ahead. In his own words, “. . . whether I have been so happy as rightly to explain the thing wherein consists the strength of motives, or not, my failing in this will not overthrow the position itself, which carries much of its own evidence with it, and is the thing of chief importance to the purpose of the ensuing discourse; and the truth of it I hope will appear with great clearness before I have finished what I have to say on the subject of human liberty.” (p.15, ¶2)
~Reepicheep~
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)